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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility in an intertemporal
consumption/savings choice model. Individuals expect to receive relevant information regarding
their own situation and tastes - generating a value for flexibility - but also expect to suffer from
temptations - generating a value for commitment. The model combines the representations of
preferences for flexibility introduced by Kreps (1979) with its recent antithesis for commitment
proposed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2002), or alternatively, the hyperbolic discounting model. We set
up and solve a mechanism design problem that optimizes over the set of consumption/saving options
available to the individual each period. We characterize the conditions under which the solution
takes a simple threshold form where minimum savings policies are optimal. Our analysis is also
relevant for other issues such as situations with externalities or the problem faced by a
"paternalistic" planner, which may be important for thinking about some regulations such as forced
minimum schooling laws.
Manuel Amador


















If people suﬀer from temptation and self-control problems, what should be done to
help them? Most analysis lead to a simple and extreme conclusion: it is optimal to
take over the individual’s choices completely. For example, in models with hyper-
bolic discounting preferences it is desirable to impose a particular savings plan on
individuals.
Indeed, one commonly articulated justiﬁcation for government involvement in re-
tirement income in modern economies is the belief that an important fraction of the
population would save “inadequately” if left to their own devices (e.g. Diamond,
1977). From the workers perspective most pension systems, pay-as-you-go and capi-
talized systems alike, eﬀectively impose a minimum saving requirement. One purpose
of this paper is to see if such minimum saving policies are optimal in a model where
agents suﬀer from the temptation to “over-consume”.
In a series of recent papers Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2002a,b) have given pref-
erences that value commitment an axiomatic foundation and derived a useful rep-
resentation theorem. In their representation the individual suﬀers from temptations
and may exert costly self-control. This formalizes the notion that commitment is
useful as a way of avoiding temptations that otherwise either adversely aﬀect choices
or require exerting costly self-control. On the opposite side of the spectrum, Kreps
(1979) provided an axiomatic foundation for preferences for ﬂexibility. His represen-
tation theorem shows that they can be represented by including taste shocks into an
expected utility framework.
Our model combines Kreps’ with Gul and Pesendorfer’s representations as fol-
lows.1 The main application modiﬁes the intertemporal taste-shock preference speci-
ﬁcation introduced by Atkeson and Lucas (1995) to incorporate temptation. In their
model the individual has preferences over random consumption streams. Each period
an i.i.d. taste shock is realized that aﬀects the individual’s desire for current consump-
tion. Importantly, the taste shock at time-t is assumed to be private information.
We modify these preferences by assuming that agents suﬀer from the temptation for
higher present consumption using Gul and Pesendorfer’s representation, in a way
1See Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) for axiomatic foundations and a representation theorem
for preferences over choice sets that encompasses both Kreps and Gul and Pessendorfer’s frameworks.
2that follows Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2001). This feature generates a desire for
commitment.
The informational asymmetry introduces a trade-oﬀ between commitment and
ﬂexibility. Commitment is valued because it reduces temptation while ﬂexibility is
v a l u e db e c a u s ei ta l l o w st h eu s eo ft h ev a l u a ble private information. We solve for the
optimal incentive compatible allocation that trades-oﬀ commitment and ﬂexibility.
One can interpret our solution as describing the optimal commitment device in a
non-trivial activity.
In addition to Gul and Pesendorfer’s framework, models with time-inconsistent
preferences, as in Strotz (1956), also generate a value for commitment. In particu-
lar, the hyperbolic discounting model has proven useful for studying the eﬀects of a
temptation to ‘over-consume’ (Phelps and Pollack, 1968) as well as the desirability of
commitment devices (Laibson, 1997). We also study in detail a version of our model
with hyperbolic-discounting preferences generating the value for commitment, with
taste shocks continuing to generate the value for ﬂexibility.
Our analysis and results can be carried over to the hyperbolic discounting model.
Indeed, Krusell, Kuruscu and Smith (2001) have pointed out the temptation frame-
work provided by Gul and Pesendorfer essentially generalizes the hyperbolic discount-
ing model: it results in the limiting case when the agent cannot exert any self-control,
giving in fully to his temptations. Although, this relationship is evident in our model,
the hyperbolic discounting model still requires some special analysis in the multi-
period case because of the diﬀe r e n tw a y sp o i n t so fi n d i ﬀerence can be resolved. In-
deed, for expositional purposes we ﬁnd it useful to treat the hyperbolic discounting
case ﬁrst and then turn to Gul and Pesendorfer’s framework.
We begin by considering a simple hyperbolic-discounting case with two possible
taste shocks. By solving this case, we illustrate how the optimal allocation depends
critically on the strength of the temptation for current consumption relative to the
dispersion of the taste shocks. For the resulting second-best problem there are two
important cases to consider.
For low levels of temptation, relative to the dispersion of the taste shocks, it is
optimal to separate the high and low taste shock agents. If the temptation is not
too low, then in order to separate them the principal must oﬀer consumption bundles
that yield somewhat to the agent’s temptation for higher current consumption. Thus,
3both bundles provide more present consumption than their counterparts in the ﬁrst
best allocation. When temptation is strong enough, separating the agents becomes
too onerous. The principal then ﬁnds it optimal to bunch both agents: she oﬀers a
single consumption bundle equal to her optimal uncontingent allocation. This solution
resolves the average over-consumption issue at the expense of foregoing ﬂexibility.
In this way, the optimal amount of ﬂexibility depends negatively on the strength
of the temptation relative to the dispersion of the taste shocks. These results with
two shocks are simple and intuitive. Unfortunately, with more than two shocks, these
results are not easily generalized. We show that with three shocks there are robust
examples where ‘money burning’ is optimal: it is optimal to have one of the agents
consuming in the interior of his budget set. Moreover, bunching can occur between
any pair of agents. The examples present a wealth of possibilities with no obvious
discernible pattern.
Fortunately, strong results are obtaine di nt h ec a s ew i t hac o n t i n u u mo ft a s t e
shocks. Our main result is a condition on the distribution of taste shocks that is
necessary and suﬃcient for the optimal mechanism to be a simple threshold rule: a
minimum savings level is imposed, with full ﬂexibility allowed above this minimum.
The optimal minimum savings level depends positively on the strength of temptation.
Thus, the main insight from the two type case carries over here: ﬂexibility falls with
the strength of temptation and this is accomplished by increased bunching.
We extend the model to include heterogeneity in temptation of current consump-
tion. This is important because it is reasonable to assume that people suﬀer from
temptation at varying degrees. Indeed, perhaps some agents do not suﬀer from temp-
tation at all. Allowing for heterogeneity in temptation would imply that those in-
dividuals that we observe saving less are more likely to be the ones suﬀering from
higher temptation. However, we show that the main result regarding the optimality
of a minimum saving policy is robust to the introduction of this heterogeneity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of the introduction
we brieﬂy discuss the related literature. Section 1 lays out the basic intertemporal
model using the hyperbolic discounting model. Section 2 analyzes this model with
two and three taste shocks while Section 3 works with a continuum of shocks. Sec-
tion 4 extends the analysis to arbitrary ﬁnite time horizons and Section 5 extends the
results to the case where agents are heterogenous with respect to their temptation.
4Section 6 contains the more general case with temptation and self-control proposed by
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001,2002a,b). Section 7 studies the case where agents discount
exponentially at a diﬀerent rate than a ‘social planner’ and preferences are logarith-
mic. Section 8 diverges to discuss some alternative interpretations and applications of
our main results regarding the optimal trade-oﬀ between committment and ﬂexibility.
The ﬁnal Section concludes. An appendix collects some proofs.
Related Literature
At least since Ramsey’s (1928) moral appeal economists have long been interested
in the implications of, and justiﬁcations for, socially discounting the future at lower
rates than individuals. Recently, Caplin and Leahy (2001) discuss a motivation for a
welfare criterion that discounts the future at a lower rate than individuals. Phelan
(2002) provides another motivation and studies implications for long-run inequality
of opportunity of a zero social discount rate. In both these papers the social planner
and agents discount the future exponentially.
Some papers on social security policies have attempted to take into account the
possible “undersaving” by individuals. Diamond (1977) discussed the case where
agents may undersave due to mistakes. Feldstein (1985) models OLG agents that
discount the future at a higher rate than the social planner and studies the optimal
pay-as-you-go system. Laibson (1998) discusses public policies that avoid undersaving
in hyperbolic discounting models. Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu and Joines (2000) use
a model with hyperbolic discounting preferences to perform a quantitative exercise
on the welfare eﬀects of pay-as-you-go social security systems. Diamond and Koszegi
(2002) use a model with hyperbolic discounting agents to study the policy eﬀects of
endogenous retirement choices. O’Donahue and Rabin (2003) advocate studying pa-
ternalism normatively by modelling the errors or biases agents may have and applying
standard public ﬁnance analysis.
Finally, several papers discuss trade-oﬀs similar to those emphasized here in var-
ious contexts not related to the intertemporal consumption/saving problem that is
our focus. Since Weitzman’s (1974) provocative paper there has been great interest in
the eﬃciency of the price system compared to a command economy, see Holmstrom
(1984) and the references therein. In a recent paper, Athey, Atkeson and Kehoe (2003)
5study a problem of optimal monetary policy that also features a trade-oﬀ between
time-consistency and discretion. Sheshinski (2002) models heterogenous agents that
make choices over a discrete set of alternatives but are subject to random errors and
shows that in such a setting reducing the set of alternatives may be optimal. Laib-
son (1994, Chapter 3) considers a moral-hazard model with a hyperbolic-discounting
agent and shows that the principal may reward the agent for high output by tilting
consumption towards the present.
1T h e B a s i c M o d e l
For reasons of exposition we ﬁrst study a consumer whose preferences are time-
inconsistent. Following Strotz (1956), Phelps and Pollack (1968), Laibson (1994,
1997, 1998) and many others we model the agent in each period as diﬀerent selves
and solve for subgame perfect equilibria of the game played between selves.I ns e c t i o n
6 we show that all our results go through when we use the more general framework
provided by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001,2002a,b) which, in addition, does not require
an intrapersonal game interpretation.
Consider ﬁrst a case with three periods. There are two periods of consumption,
t =1 ,2, a n da ni n i t i a lp e r i o dt = 0 from which we evaluate expected utility. Section
4 extends the analysis to arbitrary ﬁnite horizons. Each period agents receive an
i.i.d. taste shock θ ∈ Θ, normalized so that Eθ =1w h i c ha ﬀects the marginal
utility of current consumption: higher θ make current consumption more valuable.
The taste shock is observed privately by the agent at time t. One may think of the
taste shock as a catch-all for the signiﬁcant variation one observes in consumption
and saving data after conditioning on available observable variables.2 We denote ﬁrst
and second period consumption by c and k, respectively.
The utility for self-1 from periods t =1 ,2w i t ht a s t es h o c kθ is
θU (c)+βW (k).
where U : R+ → R and W : R+ → R are increasing, concave and continuously
2Indeed, with exponential CARA utility income shocks are equivalent to unobservable taste
shocks.
6diﬀerentiable and β ≤ 1. The notation allows W (·) 6= U (·), this generality facilitates
the extension to N periods in section 4.
The utility for self-0 from periods t =1 ,2i s
θU (c)+W (k).
Agents have quasi-geometric discounting: self-t discounts the entire future at rate
β ≤ 1 and in this respect, there is disagreement among the diﬀerent t-selves and
1−β is a measure of this disagreement or bias. On the other hand, there is agreement
regarding taste shocks: everyone values the eﬀect of θ i nt h es a m ew a y .B e l o ww eo f t e n
associate the value of β to the strength of a ‘temptation’ for current consumption;
thus, we say that temptation is stronger if β is lower.
An alternative interpretation to hyperbolic discounting is available if we consider
only periods 1 and 2. One can simply work with the assumption that the correct
welfare criterion does not discount future utility at the same rate as agents do, al-
though both do so exponentially. Although this alternative interpretation is available
for two-periods we will see that in general it does not permit a straightforward exten-
sion of the analysis to more periods. In section 7 we discuss a case in which it does
generalize.
We investigate the optimal allocation from the point of view of self-0 subject to
the constraint that θ is private information of self-1. The essential tension is between
tailoring consumption to the taste shock and the self-1’s constant higher desire for
current consumption. This generates a trade-oﬀ between commitment and ﬂexibility
from the point of view of self-0.
To solve the allocation preferred by self-0 with total income y we use the revelation
principle and set up the optimal direct truth telling mechanism given y.
v2 (y) ≡ max
c(θ),k(θ)
Z
[θU (c(θ)) + W (k(θ))]dF (θ)
θU (c(θ)) + βW (k(θ)) ≥ θU (c(θ
0)) + βW (k(θ
0)) for all θ,θ
0 ∈ Θ (1)
c(θ)+k(θ) ≤ y for all θ ∈ Θ (2)
where F (θ) is the distribution of the taste shocks with support Θ.
7This problem maximizes, given total resources y, the expected utility from the
point of view of self-0 (henceforth: the principal) subject to the constraint that θ
is private information of self-1 (henceforth: the agent). The incentive compatibility
constraint (1) ensures that it is in agent-θ’s self interest to report truthfully, thus
obtaining the allocation that is intended for him. In the budget constraints the
interest rate is normalized to zero for simplicity.
The problem above imposes a budget constraint for each θ ∈ Θ, so that insurance
across θ-agent’s is ruled out. The principal cannot transfer resources across diﬀerent
agent’s types. This choice was motivated by several considerations.
First, it may be possible to argue that the case without insurance is of direct
relevance in many situations. This could be the case if pooling risk is simply not
possible or if insurance contracts are not available because of other considerations
o u t s i d et h es c o p eo fo u rm o d e l .
Second, the cardinality of the taste shocks plays a more important role in an
analysis with insurance. The taste shock θ aﬀects ordinal preferences between current
and future consumption, c and k. However, we would like to avoid taking a strong
stand on whether or not agents with high taste for current consumption also have a
higher marginal utility from total resources as the expression θu+w implictly assumes.
Focusing on the case without insurance avoids making our analysis depend strongly
on such cardinality assumptions.
Third, without temptation (β = 1) incentive constrained insurance problems such
as Mirrlees (1971) or Atkeson and Lucas (1995) are non-trival and the resulting op-
timal allocations are not easily characterized. This would make a comparison with
the solutions with temptation (β<1) more diﬃcult. In contrast, without insurance
the optimal allocation without temptation (β = 1) is straightforward — every agent
chooses their tangency point on the budget set — allowing a clearer disentangling of
the eﬀects of introducing temptation.
Finally, we hope that studying the case without insurance may yield insights into
the case with insurance which we are currently pursuing.




{θ0U (c0)+βv2 (y0 − c0)}
8where y0, c0 and θ0 represents the initial t = 0, income, consumption and taste shock,
respectively. In what follows we ignore the initial consumption problem and focus on
non-trivial periods.
2T w o T y p e s
In this section we study the optimal commitment with only two taste shocks, θh >θ l,
occuring with probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively.
Without temptation, β =1 , there is no disagreement between the principal and
the agent and we can implement the ex-ante ﬁrst-best allocation deﬁned by the so-
lution to θU0 (cfb(θ))/W 0 (kfb(θ)) = 1 and cfb(θ)+kfb(θ)=y. For low enough
levels of temptation, so that β is close enough to 1, the ﬁrst-best allocation is still
incentive compatible. Intuitively, if the disagreement in preferences is small relative
to the dispersion of taste shocks then, at the ﬁrst best, the low shock agent would
not envy the high shock agent’s allocation.
Proposition 1 There exists a β∗ < 1 such that for β ∈ [β∗,1] the ﬁrst-best allocation
is implementable.
Proof. At β = 1 the incentive constraints are slack at the ex-ante ﬁrst-best allocation.
Deﬁne β∗ < 1t ob et h ev a l u eo fβ for which the incentive constraint of agent-θl holds
with equality at the ﬁrst best allocation (see equation (3) below). The result follows.
¥
This result relies on the discrete diﬀerence in taste shocks and no longer holds
when we study a continuum of shocks in Section 3.
For higher levels of temptation, i.e. β<β ∗, the ﬁrst best allocation is not incentive
compatible. If oﬀered, agent-θl would take the bundle meant for agent-θh to obtain
a higher level of current consumption. The next proposition characterizes optimal
a l l o c a t i o n si ns u c hc a s e s .
Proposition 2 The optimum can always be attained with the budget constraint hold-
ing with equality: c∗ (θ)+k∗ (θ)=y for θ = θh,θ l. We have that θl/θh <β ∗ and:
(a) if β>θ l/θh separation is optimal, i.e. c∗ (θh) >c ∗ (θl) and k∗ (θh) <k ∗ (θl)
9(b) if β<θ l/θh bunching is optimal, i.e. c∗ (θl)=c∗ (θh) and k∗ (θl)=k∗ (θh)
(c) if β = θl/θh separating and bunching are optimal
Proof. First, β∗ >βfollows from the incentive compatibility constraint since
β
∗ ≡ θl
U (cfb(θh)) − U (cfb(θl))
W (y − cfb(θl)) − W (y − cfb(θh))
(3)
>θ l
U0 (cfb(θh))(cfb(θh) − cfb(θl))
W0 (y − cfb(θh))(cfb(θh) − cfb(θl))
= θl
U0 (cfb(θh))




Now, consider the case where β>θ l/θh and suppose that c(θh)+k(θh) <y .
Then an increase in c(θh)a n dad e c r e a s ei nk(θh)t h a th o l d s( θl/β)U (c(θh)) +
U (k(θh)) unchanged increases c(θh)+k(θh) and the objective function. Such a
change is incentive compatible because it strictly relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint of the high type pretending to be a low type and leaves the other incentive
compatibility constraint unchanged. It follows that we must have c(θh)+k(θh)=y
at an optimum. This also shows that separating is optimal in this case, proving part
(a). Analogous arguments establish parts (b) and (c).
Finally, c(θl)+k(θl) <ycannot be optimal since lowering c(θl) and raising k(θl)
holding θlU(c(θl))+βW(k(θl)) constant would then be feasible. Such a variation does
not aﬀect one of the incentive constraints and relaxes the other, yet it increases the
objective function since θlU(c(θl)) + W(k(θl)) increases. ¥
Propositon 2 shows that for β<β ∗ the resulting non-trivial second-best problem
can be separated into essentially two cases. For intermediate levels of temptation, i.e.
θl/θh <β<β ∗, it is optimal to separate the agents. In order to separate them the
principal must oﬀer consumption bundles that yield somewhat to the agent’s ex-post
desire for higher consumption giving them higher consumption in the ﬁrst period than
the ﬁrst best.
For higher levels of temptation, i.e. β<θ l/θh, separating the agents is too onerous.
bunching them is then optimal at the best uncontingent allocation — with U = W
this implies c = k = y/2. Bunching resolves the disagreement problem at the expense
of ﬂexibility. In this way, the optimal amount of ﬂexibility depends negatively on the
size of the disagreement relative to the dispersion of the taste shocks as measured by
10θl/θh.
Proposition 2 also shows that it is always optimal to consume all the resources
c(θ)+k(θ)=y. In this sense, ‘money burning’, i.e. setting c(θ)+k(θ) <y ,i sn o t
required for optimality. As discuss below, with more than two types this is not a
foregone conclusion.
Figure 1 below shows a typical case that illustrate these results. We set U (c)=
c1−σ/(1 − σ),U(·)=W (·), and σ =2 ,θ h =1 .2, θl = .8, p =1 /2a n dy =1 . The
ﬁgure shows consumption in the ﬁrst period, c(θ), as a function of β. For comparison
we also plots the optimal ex-post consumption for both types (i.e. the full ﬂexibility
outcome). Note that these are always higher than the optimal allocation: the principal







Figure 1: Optimal ﬁrst period consumption with two shocks as a function of β.
The ﬁgure illustrates Proposition 1 and 2 in the following way. For high β the
ﬁrst best allocation is attainable so the optimal allocation does not vary with β in
this range. For intermediate β, consumption in the ﬁrst period rises as β falls. In
this way the principal yields to the agent’s desire for higher consumption. For low
enough β bunching becomes optimal and c(θ)=y/2.
To summarize, with two types we are able to characterize the optimal allocation
which enjoys nice properties. In particular, the budget constraint holds with equality
and we found simple necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a bunching or separating
o u t c o m et ob eo p t i m a l .
11Unfortunately, with more than two types extending these conclusions is not straight-
forward. For example, with three taste shocks, θh >θ m >θ l, it is simple to construct
robust examples where the optimal solution has the following properties: (i) the bud-
g e tc o n s t r a i n tf o ra g e n tθm is satisﬁed with strict inequality — i.e. ‘money burning’
is optimal; (ii) although β<θ m/θh remains a suﬃcient condition for bunching m
and h, it is no longer necessary: there are cases with β>θ m/θh where bunching θm
and θh is optimal; (iii) bunching can occur between θl and θm, with θh separated.
The examples seem to show a variety of possibilities that illustrate the diﬃculties in
characterizing the optimum with more than two types.
Fortunately, with a continuum of types more progress can be made. In the next
section we ﬁnd conditions on the distribution of θ which allows us to characterize the
optimal allocation fully.
3 Continuous Distribution of Types
Assume that the distribution of types is represented by a continuous density f (θ)
over the interval Θ ≡ [θ,θ]. Deﬁne g(θ) ≡ F (θ)+θ(1 − β)f (θ), an expression
which will be used frequently below. We ﬁnd it convenient to change variables from
(c(θ),k(θ)) to (u(θ),w(θ)) where u(θ)=U (c(θ)) and w(θ)=W (k(θ)) and we
term either pair an allocation. Let C (u)a n dK (w)b et h ei n v e r s ef u n c t i o n so fU (c)
and W (k), respectively, so that C (·)a n dK (·) are increasing and convex.
To characterize the incentive compatibility constraint (1) in this case consider the
problem faced by agent-θ when confronted with a direct mechanism (u(θ),w(θ)):










If the mechanism is truth telling then V (θ)= θ
βu(θ)+w(θ) and integrating the












(see Milgrom and Segal, 2002). It is standard to see that incentive compatibility of
(u,w)a l s or e q u i r e su to be a non-decreasing function of θ — agents that are more
12eager for current consumption cannot consume less. Thus, condition (4) and the
monotonicity of u are necessary for incentive compatibility. It is well know that these
two conditions are also suﬃcient (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991).
The principal’s problem is thus,





subject to (4), C (u(θ)) + K (w(θ)) ≤ y and u(θ0) ≥ u(θ)f o rθ0 ≥ θ.T h i sp r o b l e m
is convex since the objective function is linear and the constraint set is convex. In
particular, it follows that v2 (y)i sc o n c a v ei ny.
We now substitute the incentive compatibility constraint (4) into the objective
function and the resource constraint, and integrate the objective function by parts.
This allows us to simplify the problem by dropping the function w(θ), except for
its value at θ. Consequently, the maximization below requires ﬁnding a function
u : Θ → R and a scalar w representing w(θ).
The problem to solve is the following,
























u(˜ θ)d˜ θ ≥ 0f o ra l lθ ∈ Θ (5)
where




,u : Θ → R and u is non-decreasing}
Note that both the objective function an dt h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h ec o n s t r a i n t
are well deﬁned for all (w,u) ∈ Φ. This follows because monotonic functions are
integrable (Rudin, 1973, Theorem 6.9, pg. 126) and the product of two integrable
functions, in this case 1 − g(θ)=1− F (θ) − θ(1 − β)f (θ)a n du(θ), is integrable
(Rudin, 1973, Theorem 6.13, pg. 129).
Note that an allocation (w,u) ∈ Φ (uniquely) determines an incentive compatible
direct mechanism. If condition (5) holds, then this direct mechanism satisﬁes the
13budget constraint.
Deﬁnition. We say an allocation (w,u)i sfeasible if (w,u) ∈ Φ and (5) holds.
3.1 Bunching
For any feasible allocation (w,u) it is always possible to modify the allocation so as
to bunch an upper tail of agents, that is, give them the same bundle. Informally, this
can be done by simply removing the bundles at the very top. Those agents whose
bundle is removed will now choose the closest bundle available. The new allocation
(w, ˆ u)i sg i v e nb yˆ u(θ)=u(θ)f o rθ<ˆ θ and ˆ u(θ)=u(ˆ θ)f o rs o m et y p eˆ θ.B u n c h i n g
the upper tail is always feasible, we now show that it is optimal.
To gain some intuition, note that agents with θ ≤ β¯ θ share the ordinal preferences
of the principal with a higher taste shock equal to θ/β.T h a ti s ,t h ei n d i ﬀerence curves
θu + βw and θ/βu + w are equivalent. Informally, these agents can make a case for
their preferences. In contrast, agents with θ>β ¯ θ display a blatant over-desire for
current consumption from the principal’s point of view, in the sense that there is no
taste shock that would justify these preferences to the principal. Thus, it is intuitive
that these agents are bunched since separating them is tantamount to increasing some
of these agents consumption, yet they are already obviously “over-consuming”. The
next result shows that bunching goes even further than β¯ θ.
Proposition 3 Deﬁne θp as the lowest value in Θ such that for ˆ θ ≥ θp:
E
h






Note that θp ≤ β¯ θ and θp <β¯ θ as long as f>0. An optimal allocation (w,u ∗) has
u∗ (θ)=u∗ (θp) for θ ≥ θp (i.e. it bunchs all agents above θp)


















































for all θ ≥ θp. It follows that it is optimal to set du =0 , or equivalently u(θ)=u(θp),
for θ ≥ θp. ¥
With two types Proposition 2 showed that bunching is strictly optimal whenever
θh/θl < 1/β. Proposition 3 generalizes this result since with two types when θh/θl <
1/β then according to the deﬁnition essentially θp = θl.
If the support Θ is unbounded then θp may not exist. This occurs, for example,
with the Pareto distribution. One can show that in this case it might be optimal to
bunch all agents depending on the Pareto parameter.
3.2 Assumption A
To obtain a simple and full characterization of the optimal allocation for θ ≤ θp we
impose the following condition on the distribution F and β.
Assumption A: g(θ) ≡ (1 − β)θf (θ)+F (θ) is increasing for all θ ≤ θp.








which places a lower bound on the elasticity of the density f. The lower bound is
negative and continuously decreasing in β. The highest lower bound of −2 is attained
for β =0a n da sβ → 1 the lower bound goes oﬀ to −∞. Note that A does not
impose the bound on the whole support Θ,o n l yf o rθ ≤ θp.
For any density f such that θf0/f is bounded from below assumption A is satisﬁed
for β close enough to 1. Moreover, many densities satisfy assumption A for all β.
15For example, it is trivially satisﬁed for all density functions that are non-decreasing
and also holds for the exponential distribution, the log-normal, Pareto and Gamma
distributions for a large subset of their parameters.
3.3 Minimum Saving Policies
Deﬁne cflex(θ),k flex(θ) to be the unconstrained optimum for agent-θ,t h a ti st h e













s.t. c + k ≤ y








. Our next result shows
that under assumption A agents with θ ≤ θp are oﬀered their unconstrained opti-
mum and agents with θ ≥ θp are bunched at the unconstrained optimum for θp.




given by the ex-post unconstrained optimum of the θp-agent.







for θ ≥ θp








for θ ≥ θp.At this allocation, the agents have full ﬂexibility for
shocks smaller than θp and are bunched at θp for higher shocks. It is an allocation that
corresponds to a minimum savings rule. We now proceed to show that this allocation
is optimal.
































where the function Λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive com-
16patibility constraint. We require the Lagrange multiplier Λ to be non-decreasing (see




take Λ to be left continuous for all θ<¯ θ.
Intuitively, the Lagrange multiplier Λ can be thought of as a cumulative distribu-
tion function.3 If Λ happens to be representable by a density λ then the continuum
of constraints can be incorporated into the Lagrangian as the familiar integral of
the product of the left hand side of each constraint and the density function λ(θ).
Although this is a common approach in many applications, in general, Λ may have
points of discontinuity and such mass points are associated with individual constraints
that are particularly important. In such cases, working with a density λ would not
be valid. As we shall see, in our case the multiplier Λ is indeed discontinuous at two
points: θ and θp.

























Note that we do not need to incorporate the monotonicity condition explicitly.
Instead, we work directly with Φ which incorporates the monotonicity condition.
The proposition below draws on the following lemma which basically veriﬁes the
conditions in Luenberger (1969).




∈ Φ is optimal and u0 is continuous then there





≥ L(w,u|Λ0)( 6 )
for all (w,u) ∈ Φ with u continuous. (b) Conversely, if (6) holds for some Λ0 for all
(w,u) ∈ Φ then (u0,w 0) is optimal.
3Except for the integrability condition. Also, for notational purposes, we make Λ a left-continuous
function, instead of the usual right-continuous convention for distribution functions.
17Proof. In the appendix. ¥
If the Lagrangian has linear Gateaux diﬀerentials then because it is concave it
follows it is maximized within a convex cone if and only the ﬁrst-order conditions




≥ L(w,u|Λ0) for all (w,u) ∈ P, where P is a convex










≤ 0( 8 )
for all (hw,h u) ∈ P (see Luenberger, Chapter 8, Lemma 1, pg. 227).
Note that the Lagrangian is the sum of integrals over θ of concave functions of ¯ w
and u(θ). In the appendix we show that this implies that the Gateaux diﬀerential
exists and can be easily computed. In particular, at the proposed allocation (w∗,u ∗)
























Proposition 4 The proposed allocation (w∗,u ∗) is optimal if and only if assumption
Ah o l d s .
Proof. Necessity. Since (w∗,u ∗) is optimal then there should exist a non-decreasing
Λ∗ such that ﬁrst-order conditions (7) and (8) hold. We will show that if assumption A
does not hold then the ﬁrst-order conditions require a decreasing Λ∗, a contradiction.
Condition (8) with hu =0r e q u i r e st h a tΛ∗ (θ)=0s i n c ehw is unrestricted. Using
Λ∗ (θ) = 0 and integrating (9) by parts leads to (Theorem 6.20 in Rudin guarantees



























It follows that condition (8) implies that γ (θ) ≤ 0f o ra l lθ ∈ Θ. Suppose that there
is a θ1 such that γ (θ1) > 0 then we argue that there is an interval [θ0,θ 1] such that
γ (θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ0,θ 1]. This follows since in the deﬁnition of γ the ﬁrst term
is continuous and the second term is non-increasing. But such an interval leads to a
contradiction with (8) for any continuous non-decreasing function hu that is strictly
increasing within [θ0,θ 1]a n dc o n s t a n tf o rΘ − [θ0,θ 1].
Given γ (θ) ≤ 0f o ra l lθ ∈ Θ, (7) implies that γ (θ)=0f o rθ ∈ [θ,θ p], i.e.
wherever u∗ is strictly increasing. It follows that,
Λ
∗ (θ)=g(θ),
for all θ ∈ (θ,θ p]. The proposed allocation (w∗,u ∗) thus determines a unique candidate
multiplier Λ∗ in the separating region (θ,θ p] and assumption A is necessary and
suﬃcient for Λ∗ (θ) to be non-decreasing in this region. It follows that assumption A
is necessary for the proposed solution (w∗,u ∗)t ob eo p t i m a l .
Suﬃciency. We now prove suﬃciency by showing that there exists a non-decreasing
multiplier Λ∗ such that the proposed (w∗,u ∗)s a t i s ﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions (7)
and (8) for all (hw,h u) ∈ Φ. We’ve speciﬁed Λ∗ for (θ,θ p] that is consistent with









The constructed Λ is not continuous, it has an upward jump at θ and a jump at
θp. To show that Λ∗ is non-decreasing all that remains is to show that the jump at
θp is upward,
Λ






− g(θp) ≥ 0,
which follows from the deﬁnition of θp.T os e et h i s ,n o t et h a ti fθp = θ the result is
immediate since then Λ∗ would jump from 0 to Λ
¡¯ θ
¢
at θ. Otherwise, notice that,
by deﬁnition, θp is the lowest ˆ θ such that γ (θ) ≤ 0 for all θ ≥ ˆ θ, which implies that




Given the proposed allocation (w∗,u ∗) and the constructed Lagrange multiplier Λ∗
imply that γ ≤ 0a n dt h a tγ = 0 wherever u∗ is increasing. The Gateaux diﬀerential
19is also given by (10), integration by parts is warranted for non-decreasing hu given
the particular Λ∗ constructed. It follows that the ﬁrst-order conditions (7) and (8)
are satisﬁed. ¥
The ﬁgure below illustrates the form of the multiplier Λ∗ (θ) constructed in the
proof of the proposition.
θ
separating with full flexibility bunching
θp θ θ
Λ(θ)
Figure 2: The Lagrange multiplier Λ∗ (θ)
Proposition 4 shows that under assumption A the optimal allocation is extremely
simple. It can be implemented by imposing a maximum level of current consumption,
or equivalently, a minimum level of savings. Such minimum saving policies are a
pervasive part of social security systems around the world.
The next result shows the comparative statics of the optimal allocation with re-
spect to temptation β. As the temptation increases, i.e. β decreases, more types are
bunched (i.e. θp decreases). In terms of policies, as the disagreement increases the
minimum savings requirement decreases so there is less ﬂexibility in the allocation.
Proposition 5 The bunching point θp increases with β. The minimum savings re-
quirement, smin = y − C (u(θp)), decreases with β.
Proof.T h a tθp is weakly increasing follows directly from its deﬁnition. To see that
smin is decreasing note that smin solves
θp
β
U0 (y − smin)
W0 (smin)
=1 ,
20and that θp, when interior, solves,
θp
β
= E [θ|θ ≥ θp].
Combining these, we obtain E [θ|θ ≥ θp]U0 (y − smin)/W 0 (smin)=1 .S i n c eE [θ|θ ≥ θp]
is increasing in θp the result follows from concavity of U and W. ¥
3.4 Drilling
In this subsection we study cases where assumption A does not hold and show that
the allocation described in Proposition 4 can be improved upon by drilling holes in
the separating section where the condition in assumption A is not satisﬁed.
Suppose we are oﬀering the unconstrained optimum for some closed interval [θa,θ b]
of agents and we consider removing the open interval (θa,θ b). Agents that previously
found their tangency within the interval will move to one of the two extremes, θa or
θb. The critical issue in evaluating the change in welfare is counting how many agents
moving to θa versus θb. For a small enough interval, welfare rises from those moving
to θa and falls from those moving to θb.
Since the relative measure of agents moving to the right versus the left depends on
the slope of the density function this explains its role in assumption A. For example,
if f0 > 0t h e nu p o nr e m o v i n g( θa,θ b) more agents would move to the right than the
left. As a consequence, such a change is undesirable. The proof of the next result
formalizes these ideas.
Let θind ∈ [θa,θ b] be the agent type that obtains the same utility from reporting
θa or θb.W e ﬁnd it more convenient to state the next result in terms of c(θ)a n d
k(θ).
Proposition 6 Suppose an allocation (c(θ),k(θ)) satisﬁes incentive compatibility
(1) and the budget constraint (2) and has c(θ)=cflex(θ) and k(θ)=kflex(θ) for θ ∈
[θa,θ b],w h e r eθb ≤ θp.T h e ni fg(θ) is decreasing on [θa,θ b] the allocation (˜ c(θ),˜ k(θ))
deﬁned below increases the objective function, remains incentive compatible (1) and








;f o rθ 6∈ [θa,θ b]
;f o rθ ∈ (θa,θ ind)
;f o rθ ∈ [θind,θ b)
Proof. In the appendix. ¥
Proposition 6 illustrates by construction why assumption A is necessary for a
simple ‘threshold rule’ to be optimal and gives some insight into this assumption. Of
course, Proposition 6 only identiﬁes particular improvements whenever assumption A
fails. We have not characterized the full optimum when assumption A does not hold.
It seems likely that ‘money burning’ may be optimal in some cases.
4 Arbitrary Finite Horizons
We now show that our results extend to arbitrary ﬁnite horizons. We conﬁne ourselves
to ﬁnite horizons because with inﬁnite horizons any mechanism may yield multiple
equilibria in the resulting game. These equilibria may involve reputation in the sense
that a good equilibrium is sustained by a threat of reverting to a bad equilibria
upon a deviation. Some authors have questioned the credibility of such reputational
equilibria in intrapersonal games (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2002a, and Kocherlakota,
1996). We avoid these issues by focusing on ﬁnite horizons.
Consider the problem with N<∞ periods t =1 ,...,N where the felicity function
is U (·)i ne a c hp e r i o d .L e tθt =( θ1,θ 2,...,θt) denote the history of shocks up to time
t. A direct mechanism now requires that at time t the agent makes reports rt on the
history of shocks rt =( rt
1,r t
2,...,r t
t). The agent observes the history of shocks as well
as the history of reports made by the previous selves. The agent’s consumption may
depend on the whole history of reports ct (rt,rt−1,...,r1).
We ﬁrst argue that without loss in optimality we can restrict ourselves to mecha-
nisms that at time t require only a report rt on the current shock θt, and not of the
whole history of shocks θt. This is the case in Atkeson and Lucas (1995) but in their
setup since preferences are time-consistent there is a single player and the argument
22is straightforward.
In contrast, in the hyperbolic model we have N players and the diﬀerence in
preferences between these selves can be exploited to punish past deviations. For
example, an agent at time t that is indiﬀerent between allocations can be asked
to choose amongst them according to whether there has been a deviation in the
past. In particular, she can ‘punish’ previous deviating agents by selecting the worst
allocations from their point of view. Otherwise, if there have been no past deviations,
she can ‘reward’ the truth-telling agents by selecting the allocation preferred by them.
Such schemes may make deviations more costly, relaxing the incentive constraints,
and are thus generally desirable.
One way to remove the possibility of these punishment schemes is to introduce
the reﬁnement that when agents are indiﬀerent between several allocations choose
the one that maximizes the utility of previous selves. Indeed, Gul and Pesendorfer’s
(2001,2002a,b) framework, discussed in Section 6, delivers, in the limit without self-
control, the hyperbolic model with this added reﬁnement.
However, with a continuous distribution for θ such a reﬁnement is not necessary
to rule out these punishment schemes. We show that for any mechanism the subset
of Θ over which θ-agents are indiﬀe r e n ti sa tm o s tc o u n t a b l e .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h e
probability that future selves will ﬁnd themselves indiﬀerent is zero so that the threat
of using indiﬀerence to punish past deviations has no deterrent eﬀect.
For any set A of pairs (u,w)d e ﬁne the optimal correspondence over x ∈ X
M (x;A) ≡ arg max
(u,w)∈A
{xu + w}
(we allow the possibility that M (x,A) is empty) then we have the following result.
Lemma (Indiﬀerence is countable). For any A the subset XI ⊂ X for which
M (x;A) has two or more points (set of agents that are indiﬀerent) is at most count-
able.
Proof. The correspondence M (x;A) is monotone in the sense that if x1 <x 2 and
(u1,w 1) ∈ M (x1;A)a n d( u2,w 2) ∈ M (x2;A)t h e nu1 ≤ u2. Thus, in an obvious
sense, points at which there are more than a single element in M (x;A)r e p r e s e n t
upward ‘jumps’. As with monotonic functions, it follows easily that M (x;A)c a n
have at most a countable number of such ‘jumps’. ¥
23This result relies only on the single crossing property of preferences and not on the
linearity in u and w. We make use of this lemma again in Section 5.
These considerations lead us to write the problem with T ≥ 3r e m a i n i n gp e r i o d s
and income yT recursively as follows.
vT (yT)=m a x
cT,k T
Z
[θU (cT (θ)) + vT−1 (kT (θ))]dF (θ)
θU (cT (θ)) + βvT−1 (kT (θ)) ≥ θhU(cT(θ
0)) + βvT−1(kT(θ
0)) for all θ,θ
0 ∈ Θ
cT (θ)+kT (θ) ≤ yT for all θ ∈ Θ
where v2 (·)w a sd e ﬁn e di nS e c t i o n1 .
Any feasible continuation utility proﬁle ˜ wT−1 (θ) ∈ [(T − 1)U (0),v T−1 (kT (θ))]
can be achieved by ‘money burning’ with the same eﬀect: setting ˜ wT−1 (θ)=vT−1(˜ kT(θ))
for some ˜ kT(θ) ≤ kT (θ). Consequently, the above formulation imposes ex-post opti-
mality, that is given the resources available the continuation utility is vT−1(˜ kT(θ)).
For the simple recursive representation to obtain it is critical that, although the
principal and the agent disagree on the amount of discounting between the current
and next period, they both agree on the utility obtained from the next period on,
given by vT−1. This is not true in the alternative setup where the principal and the
agent both discount exponentially but with diﬀerent discount factors. We treat this
case separately in Section 7.
For any horizon T this problem has exactly the same structure as the two-period
problem analyzed previously, with the exception that vT−1 (θ) has substituted W (θ).
We only required W (θ) to be increasing and concave and since vT−1 (θ)h a st h e s e
properties all the previous results apply. We summarize this result in the next propo-
sition.
Proposition 7 Under assumption A the optimal allocation with a horizon of N pe-
riods can be implemented by imposing a minimum amount of saving St (yt) in period
t.
In Proposition 7 the minimum saving is a function of resources yt. With CRRA
preferences the optimal allocation is linearly homogenous in y,s ot h a tc(θ,y)=˜ c(θ)y
24and k(θ,y)=˜ k(θ)y. It follows that the optimal mechanism imposes a minimum
saving rate f o re a c hp e r i o dt h a ti si n d e p e n d e n to fyt.
Proposition 8 Under assumption A and U (c)=c1−σ/(1 − σ) the optimal mecha-
nism for the N-period problem imposes a minimum saving rate st for each period t
independent of yt.
4.1 Hidden Savings
Another property of the optimal allocation identiﬁed in Propositions 4 and 7 is worth
mentioning. Suppose agents can save, but not borrow, privately behind the principal’s
back at the same rate of return as the principal, as in Cole and Kocherlakota (2001).
The possibility of this ‘hidden saving’ reduces the set of allocations that are incentive
compatible since the agent has a strictly larger set of possible deviations. Importantly,
the mechanism described in Proposition 7 continues to implement the same allocation
when we allow agents to save privately, and thus remains optimal.
To prove this claim we argue that confronted with the mechanism in Proposition
7 agents that currently have no private savings would never ﬁnd it optimal to ac-
cumulate private savings. To see this, ﬁrst note that by Proposition 7 the optimal
mechanism imposes only a minimum on savings in each period. Thus agent-θ always
have the option of saving more observably with the principal than what the allocation
recommends, yet by incentive compatibility the agent chooses not to.
Next, note that saving privately on his own can be no better for the agent than
increasing the amount of observable savings with the principal. This is true because
the principal maximizes the agents utility given the resources at its disposal. Thus,
from the point of view of the current self, future wealth accumulated by hidden savings
is dominated by wealth accumulated with the principal.
It follows that agents never ﬁnd it optimal to save privately and the mechanism
implements the same allocation when agents can or cannot save privately.
Proposition 9 Under assumption A the mechanism described in Proposition 7 im-
plements the same allocation when agents can save privately.
255 Heterogeneous Temptation
Consider now the case where the level of temptation, measured by β, is random. Het-
erogeneity in β captures the commonly held view that the temptation to overconsume
is not uniform in the population and that it is the agents that save the least that
are more likely to be ‘undersaving’ because of a higher temptation to consume (e.g.
Diamond, 1977).
If the heterogeneity in temptation were due to permanent diﬀerences across indi-
viduals then the previous analysis would apply essentially unaltered. If agents knew
their β at time time 0 they would truthfully report it so that their mechanism could
be tailored to their β as described above4. To explore other possibilities we assume
the other extreme, that diﬀerences in temptation are purely idiosyncratic, so that β
is i.i.d. across time and individuals. Thus, each period θ and β are realized together
from a continuous distribution — we do not require independence of θ and β for our
results. We continue to assume that β ≤ 1f o rs i m p l i c i t y .









Note that this argmax set is identical for all types with the same ratio x ≡ θ/β which
implies that we can without loss in optimality assume the allocation depend only on
x.
To see this note that the allocation may depend on θ and β independently for
ag i v e nx only if the x-agent is indiﬀerent amongst several pairs of u,w. However,
the lemma in section 4 showed that the set of x for which agents are indiﬀerent is
of measure zero. As a consequence, allowing the allocation to depend on θ or β
independently, in addition to x, cannot improve the objective function. Without loss
in optimality we limit ourselves to allocations that are functions of x only5.
4Of course, if agents can only report at t = 1 then one cannot costlessly obtain truthfull reports
on β. However, with large enough N it is likely that the cost of revealing β would be small.
5Given β ≤ 1 a simpler argument is available. The planner can simply instruct agents with given
x to choose the element of the arg max with the lowest u, since the planner has a strict preference
for the lowest u element. The argument in the text is similar to the one used to extend the analysis
to arbitrary horizons and can be applied to the case where β>1 is allowed.
26The objective function is then:
E [θu(x)+w(x)] = E [E [θu(x)+w(x)|x]] =
Z
[α(x)u(x)+w(x)] ˆ f (x)dx
where α(x)=E (θ|x)a n d ˆ f (x) is the density over x.L e tX =[ x, ¯ x] be the support
of x and ˆ F (x) be its cumulative distribution.
Deﬁne xp as the lowest value such that for ˆ x ≥ xp
E [α(x)|x ≥ ˆ x]
ˆ x
≤ 1
We modify our previous assumption A in the following way.
Assumption ˜ A. For x ∈ [x,x p], we have that
x ˆ f0 (x)
ˆ f (x)
≥−
2 − α0 (x)
1 − α(x)/x
Note that without heterogeneity α(x)=βx so that assumptions ˜ A and A are











C (u(x)) + K (w(x)) ≤ 1
u(x) ≥ u(y)f o ra l lx ≥ y
The proof of the next result closely follows the proof of proposition 4.
Proposition 10 Under assumption ˜ A agents with x<x p are oﬀered their uncon-
strained optimum and agents with x ≥ xp are bunched at the unconstrained optimum
for agent xp.
276 Commitment with Self Control
Gul and Pesendorfer (2001,2002a,b) introduced an axiomatic foundation for prefer-
ences for commitment. We review their setup and representation result brieﬂyi n
general terms and then describe how we apply it to our framework.
In their static formulation the primitive is a preferences ordering over sets of
choices, with utility function P (A)o v e rc h o i c es e t sA. In the classical case P (A)=
maxa∈A p(a) for some utility function p deﬁned directly over actions. Note that in
this case if a set A is reduced to A0 without removing the best element, a∗ from A,
then P is not altered. In this sense, committment, a preference for smaller sets, is
not valued.
To model a preference for commitment they assume a consumer may strictly prefer
as e tA0 that is a strict subset A, i.e. P (A0) >P(A)a n dA0 ⊂ A. They show that
such preferences can be represented by two utility functions ˜ U and ˜ V over choices a
by the relation:
P (A)=m a x
ˆ a∈A
{p(ˆ a)+t(ˆ a)} − max
a∈A
t(a)
One can think of t(a) − maxa∈A t(a) as the cost of self-control suﬀered by an agent
when choosing a instead of argmaxa∈A t(a). In a dynamic setting recursive prefer-
ences with temptation can be represented similarly (Gul and Pessendorfer, 2002a,b).
In our framework the action is a choice for current consumption and savings, c
and k. In order to nest the hyperbolic preferences model we follow Krusell, Kuruscu
and Smith (2001) and use:
p(c,k)=θU (c)+W (k)
t(c,k)=φ(θU (c)+βW (k))
where the parameter φ>0 captures the lack of self control. As φ →∞the agent has
no self-control and yields fully to his temptation. His preferences essentially converge
to those implied by the hyperbolic model. The only diﬀerence is that in the limit
as φ →∞we obtain a tie-breaking criteria that whenever an agent is indiﬀerent he
s e l e c t sw h a t e v e ri sb e s tf o rh i sp r e v i o u s‘ s e l v e s ’( i . e .m a x i m i z e st).










[θυ + βω]f (θ)dθ (11)
Before we proceed we need some deﬁnitions. Let ˆ β ≡ (1 + φβ)/(1 + φ), θ ≡ θβ/ˆ β,
and h(θ) ≡ f(θˆ β/β)(ˆ β/β). Note that h(θ) is the density of the random variable
θβ/ˆ β;l e tH (θ) represent its corresponding distribution function. For future use, let
us deﬁne
ˆ g(θ) ≡
1+( 1+φ)(ˆ β/β)H (θ) − φF (θ)
(1 + φ) ˆ β/β − φ
= β [1 + (1/β)H (θ)+φ(H (θ) − F (θ))]
since this expression will appear frequently below.
The following Lemma allows us to rewrite the problem in terms of an allocation
(u,w)d e ﬁned over a larger domain ˆ Θ ≡ [θ, ¯ θ].
Lemma. The objective function (11) can be written as
(1 + φ)(ˆ β/β)










[θυ + ω + φ(θυ + βω)] = (1 + φ)m a x
υ,ω∈A
(θυ + ˆ βω)








for ˆ u, ˆ w and u,w such that
(ˆ u(θ), ˆ w(θ)) ∈ arg max
υ,ω∈A
(θυ + ˆ βω)f o r a l l θ ∈ Θ,
(u(θ),w(θ)) ∈ arg max
υ,ω∈A
(θυ + βω)f o r a l l θ ∈ Θ.
29Note that since, argmaxυ,ω∈A(θυ + ˆ βω)=a r gm a x υ,ω∈A((θβ/ˆ β)υ + βω)i fw ee x t e n d
the domain of u and w to ˆ Θ. Then we can write these two conditions as,
(ˆ u(θ), ˆ w(θ)) = (u(θβ/ˆ β),w(θβ/ˆ β)) for all θ ∈ Θ,
(u(θ),w(θ)) ∈ arg max
υ,ω∈A
(θυ + βω)f o r a l l θ ∈ ˆ Θ.








The ﬁr s tt e r mo f( 1 3 )i se q u a lt o( 1+φ)(ˆ β/β)
R ¯ θβ/ˆ β
θ (θu(θ)+βw(θ))f(θˆ β/β)(ˆ β/β)dθ
so that using the deﬁnition of h(θ) yields (12). ¥
Given any set A an allocation that satisﬁes (u(θ),w(θ)) ∈ argmaxυ,ω∈A(θυ +
βω)f o r a l l θ ∈ ˆ Θ must satisfy the incentive constraints:
θu(θ)+βw(θ) ≥ θu(θ
0)+βw(θ
0)f o r a l l θ,θ
0 ∈ ˆ Θ. (14)
Indeed, the set {(υ0,ω0) | (υ0,ω0)=( u(θ),w(θ)) for some θ ∈ ˆ Θ} delivers the same
utility as A. Thus, we can pose the problem as maximizing (12) subject to (14) and
the resource constraint, C (u(θ)) + K (w(θ)) ≤ y for all θ ∈ ˆ Θ.




u(˜ θ)d˜ θ for all θ ∈ ˆ Θ. (15)
with u(θ) non-decreasing. Substituting this into the resource constraint yields,
βK









d˜ θ − θu(θ)
!
≥ 0.
30Subsituting (15) into (13) and integrating by parts, we obtain:
(1 + φ)(ˆ β/β)
Z ¯ θ
θ
(1 − H (θ))u(θ)dθ−φ
Z ¯ θ
θ
(1 − F (θ))u(θ)dθ (16)
+[ ( θ/β)u(θ)+w(θ)],
where we are taking both intervals of integration as being from θ to ¯ θ by naturally
extending f and h so that h(θ)=0 ,f o ra l lθ>¯ θβ/ˆ β,a n df (θ)=0 ,f o ra l lθ<θ ..








d˜ θ ≤ 0
Assumption B. For θ ∈ [θ,θ p], ˆ g(θ) ≡ β [1 + (1/β)H (θ)+φ(H (θ) − F (θ))] is
increasing.
This assumption is equivalent to (1 + φ)(ˆ β/β)2f(θˆ β/β) − φf (θ) ≥ 0. Note that
assumption B is satisﬁed always for θ ∈ [θ,θ].
We now show that the optimal allocation is to oﬀer all types below θp their uncon-
strained optimum and to bunch types higher than θp at the unconstrained optimum
for θp. Denote this allocation by (w∗,u ∗) as before.




























where Λ is a non-decreasing Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint, normalized
so that Λ(¯ θ)=1 .
Proposition 11 The allocation (w∗,u ∗) is optimal if and only if assumption ˆ A holds.
31Proof. The proof proceeds along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 4, except
that Λ does not jump at θ (because ˆ g(θ)i sz e r oa tθ). ¥
The next result establishes a connection between assumptions A and B showing
that B is a weaker requirement.
Lemma (A implies B). If the condition for assumption A holds for [θ,θ pˆ β/β], then
the condition for assumption ˆ A holds for [θ,θ p].
Proof.I nt h ea p p e n d i x .¥
7 Disagreement on Exponential Discounting
This section departs a bit from our intra-personal temptation environment. We now
consider the case where individuals discount the future exponentially but do so at a
diﬀerent rate than a ‘social planner’. Caplin and Leahy (2001) and Phelan (2002)
provide motivations for such an assumption. Here we simply explore the implications
of such a diﬀerence in discount rates.
It is important to note that this modiﬁcation constitutes more than just a de-
parture on the form of discounting. Our previous analysis relied on the tensions
within an individual due to temptation. In contrast, in the current case we require
some paternalistic motivation for the social planner’s disagreement with agents. As
a consequence, some may view this case as more ad hoc and somehow less worthy of
analysis. However, we believe that paternalistic motivations may be behind several
government policies. In the next section we discuss other examples of paternalism.
For the two period case the analysis requires absolutely no change, only a diﬀerent
interpretation for β.T h ed i ﬀerence in discounting in the incentive constraints versus
the objective function now arises from an assumed diﬀerence in private and social
discounting, it is no longer motivated by time inconsistent preferences. The relevant
question that remains is whether we can extend the results to longer horizons.
Ad i ﬃculty is that the planner and agent will disagree on more than just how much
to discount future utility relative to present utility: now there is also disagreement
on the evaluation of future lifetime utility itself. This makes a recursive formulation
more diﬃcult since the key simpliﬁcation was that the same value function appeared
in the objective function and in the incentive constraints.
32Indeed, now we require two value functions, one for the planner, v,a n do n ef o rt h e
agent, vA. Fortunately, in the case with logarithm i cu t i l i t yt h e s et w ov a l u ef u n c t i o n s
are related in a simple way. This allows us to keep track of only one value function,
v, rendering the analysis tractable. We can show that all our results go through in
this case.
Consider ﬁrst the situation with three periods. Let the exponential discount factor
for the agent be given by β and for simplicity assume the discount factor for the social
planner is unity.





for some constant BA. For any homogenous mechanism the planner’s value function
for the last two periods takes the form:
v2 (y)=2l o g( y)+B
P
The important point is that these value functions diﬀer only by constants and coef-
ﬁcients. As a consequence the correct incentive constraint for the ﬁrst period can be
written with either value function. That is,
θU (c(θ)) + βv
A





























where ˆ β3 = β(1 + β)/2 < 1i saﬁctitious hyperbolic discount factor when there are
three periods to go. Note that the incentive constraint (17) has all the features of the
hyperbolic discounting case.
Thus, we can we can write the three period problem disagreement on exponential
discounting in the same way as the hyperbolic discounting problem. The arguments
generalizes to any ﬁnite horizon. With k remaining periods the discount factor that
33must be applied is
ˆ βk ≡ β
1+β + ... + βk−1
k
< 1.
Note that βk is decreasing in k and converges to zero (this last feature is special to
the planner not discounting the future at all).
8 Other Interpretations
In this section we discuss how our model can be reinterpreted for other applications.
8.1 Paternalism
Another interesting application of the model to a paternalistic problem is the choice
between schooling and leisure choice. In many cases the relevant agent is not yet
an adult so that we can interpret paternalism literally as a struggle between the
preferences of parents and child. Alternatively, other adults may be altruistically
concerned about children without parents and support paternalistic legislation.
The child’s preference are given by the utility function θU (l)+βW (s)where s
represents schooling time and l represents other valuable uses of time. The taste
parameter θ aﬀects the relative value placed on schooling vs. other activities. The
parent’s preferences are given by θU (s)+W (s), so that more weight is given to
schooling time.
The allocation of time is constrained by the time endowment normalized to one,
s + l ≤ 1. In this example no insurance is possible.
8.2 Externalities
Another origin for a divergence of preferences between the planner and the agents is
when consumption of a good generates positive externalities. Agents do not internal-
ize the eﬀects of their consumption on other agents but the planner does.
To make this precise, suppose there are two goods, c and k,t h a tt h ea g e n tw i t h
taste shock θ obtains the following utility when the entire allocation is (c(θ),k(θ))
V (θ;(c(·),k(·))) ≡ θU (c(θ)) + βW (k(θ)) + (1 − β)
Z
W (k(θ))dF (θ)( 1 8 )






(θU (c(θ)) + W (k(θ)))dF (θ).
Thus, we can represent θU (c)+W (k) as the relevant utility function for agent-θ
from the planner’s point of view. Although this is not the utility actually attained
by agent-θ, which is given by the expression in (18), it is an interpretation that leads
to the same welfare functional.
9C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studied the optimal trade-oﬀ between commitment and ﬂexibility in an
intertemporal consumption/saving model without insurance. In our model, agents
expect to receive relevant private information regarding their tastes which creates a
demand for ﬂexibility. But they also expect to suﬀer from temptations, and therefore
value commitment. The model combined the representation theorems of preferences
for ﬂexibility introduced by Kreps (1979) with the preferences for commitment pro-
posed by Gul and Pesendorfer (2002).
We solved for the optimal solution that trades-oﬀ commitment and ﬂexibility by
setting up a mechanism design problem. We showed that under certain conditions
the optimal allocation takes the simple threshold form of a minimum savings require-
ment. We characterized the condition on the distribution of the shocks under which
this result holds, and showed that if this condition is not satisﬁed, more complex
mechanisms might be optimal. Future work will focus on the case with insurance,
with a hope of understanding how it may aﬀect the results obtained here.
The model is open to a variety of other interpretations. A paternalistic principal
who cares about an agent but believes the agent is biased on average in his choices
would face a similar trade-oﬀ as long as the agent has some private information
regarding his tastes that the planner also cares about. We discussed applications to
schooling choices by teenagers and situations with externalities.
35A The Lagrangian Lemma
Our optimization problem maps into the general problem studied in Sections 8.3-8.4
by Luenberger (1969): maxx∈X Q(x) subject to x ∈ Ω and G(x) ∈ P,w h e r eΩ is a
subset of the vector space X, Q : Ω → R and G : Ω → Z,w h e r eZ is a normed vector
space and P is a positive non-empty convex cone in Z.
F o rp a r t( b )w es e t :




and u : Θ → R}








and u is non-decreasing} ≡ Φ
Z =
½
z | z : Θ → R with sup
θ∈Θ
|z (θ)| < ∞
¾
with the norm kzk =s u p
θ∈Θ
|z (θ)|
P = {z | z ∈ Z and z (θ) ≥ 0f o ra l lθ ∈ Θ}










[(1 − F (θ)) − θ(1 − β)f (θ)]u(θ)dθ
G(w,u)=K












The result then follows immediately since the hypothesis of Theorem 1, pg. 220 in
Luenberger (1969) are met.
F o rp a r t( a )w em o d i f yΩ and Z to require continuity of u:








and u is continuous and non-decreasing}
Z = {z | z : Θ → R and z is continuous} with the norm kzk =s u p
θ∈Θ
|z (θ)|
with X, P, Q and G as before. Note that Q and G are concave, Ω is convex, P
contains an interior point (e.g. z (θ)=1 , for all θ ∈ Θ,i si n t e r i o r )a n dt h a tt h e
positive dual of Z is isomorphic to the space of non-decreasing functions on Θ by
the Riesz Representation Theorem (see Chapter 5, pg. 113 in Luenberger (1969)).
Finally, if w0,u 0 is optimal within Φ and w0,u 0 ∈ Φ ∩ {u is continuous} then w0,u 0
is optimal within the subset Φ∩{u is continuous} ≡ Ω. The result then follows since
36the hypothesis of Theorem 1, pg. 217 in Luenberger (1969) are met.
B Lemma on Diﬀerentiability
Deﬁnition. Given a function T : Ω → Y ,w h e r eΩ ⊂ X and X and Y are normed





[T (x + αh) − T (x)]






(Θ, ˜ Θ,µ) is any measure space (not necessarily R or a vector space) and x : Θ → Rn
in some space Ω for which T is deﬁned (an arbitrary restriction or perhaps a required
restriction to ensure measurability and integrability). Suppose g(·,θ) is concave and
gx (·,θ) exists and is continuous in x,f o ra l lθ.T h e n a s l o n g a s x + αh ∈ Ω for





if this expression is well deﬁned.
Proof. By deﬁnition























[g(x(θ)+αh(θ),θ) − g(x(θ),θ)] − gx (x(θ),θ)h(θ)
¸
dµ(θ)
37since for α<εwe have
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
1
α
[g(x(θ)+αh(θ),θ) − g(x(θ),θ)] − gx (x(θ),θ)h(θ)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
1
ε
[g(x(θ)+εh(θ),θ) − g(x(θ),θ)] − gx(x(θ),θ)h(θ)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
by concavity of g.
Since g(x(θ)+εh(θ),θ), g(x(θ),θ)a n dgx (x(θ),θ)h(θ) are integrable by as-
sumption it follows that 1
ε [g(x(θ)+εh(θ),θ) − g(x(θ),θ)]−gx (x(θ),θ)h(θ)i sa l s o
integrable. Since any function f is integrable if and only if |f| is integrable [see Exer-
cise 7.26, pg. 192, chapter 8, SLP] we have that |1
ε [g(x(θ)+εh(θ),θ) − g(x(θ),θ)]−





















[g(x(θ)+αh(θ),θ) − g(x(θ),θ)] − gx (x(θ),θ)h(θ)
¸
dµ =0




Remark: Suppose Ω is convex and that we are interested in δT (x0;h)t h e nt h e
obvious requirement that x0 + αh ∈ Ω for α ∈ [0,ε]f o rs o m eε>0i ss a t i s ﬁed if
and only if h = x1 − x0 and x1 ∈ Ω. Note that the case where Ω is the space of
non-decreasing functions is convex.
C Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose that we are oﬀering a segment of the budget line between the tangency point
for θL and that of θH, with associated allocation cL and cH.D e ﬁne the θ∗ that is
indiﬀerent from the allocation cL and cH then θ∗ ∈ (θL,θ H)f o rθH >θ L.U p o n
removing the interval θ ∈ (θ∗,θ H)t y p e sm o v et ocH and θ ∈ (θL,θ ∗)t y p e sm o v et o
cL allocation.
38Let ∆(θH,θ L) be the change in utility for the principal of such a move (normalizing

















∗ (θ)) + W (y − c
∗ (θ))}f (θ)dθ
where the function c∗ (θ)i sd e ﬁned implicitly by
θU
0 [c
∗ (θ)] = βW
0 (y − c
∗ (θ)) (19)
and θ∗ (θH,θ L)i st h e nd e ﬁned by
θ
∗ (θH,θ L)U (c
∗ (θH)) + βW (y − c
∗ (θH)) (20)
= θ
∗ (θH,θ L)U (c
∗ (θL)) + βW (y − c
∗ (θL))
Notice that ∆(θL,θ L)=0 .
The following lemma regarding the partial derivative of ∆(θH,θ L)i su s e db e l o w .









where S (θ;θ∗)i sd e ﬁned by,
S (θ,θ














Since U0 (c∗ (θH)) > 0a n d
∂c∗(θH)
∂θH > 0, then sign(∆1)=sign(S (θH,θ ∗)).
39Proof. We have
∆1 (θH,θ L)=[ θHU (c
∗ (θH)) + W (y − c
∗ (θH))]f (θH)
− [θ
∗ (θH,θ L)U (c










∗ (θH)) − W






∗ (θH,θ L)U (c














∗ (θH)) − W






∗ (θH,θ L)[U (c
∗ (θL)) − U (c
∗ (θH))] + W (y − c





Now, from (20) we have
θU
0 [c
∗ (θ)] − W



























∗ (θH,θ L)[U (c
∗ (θL)) − U (c
∗ (θH))] + W (y − c










∗ (θL)) − U (c
∗ (θH))] = {W (y − c





































∗ (θH)) − U (c
∗ (θL))] = −[θ
∗U
0 (c
∗ (θH)) − βW








∗ (θH)) − U (c






Substituting back the result follows. ¥
From the lemma we only need to sign S (θH,θ ∗). Clearly, S (θ∗,θ ∗)=0 .T a k i n g





















2 = −(2 − β)f (θ) − (1 − β)θf
0 (θ)
Note that ∂2S (θ,θ∗)/(∂θ)




























41Thus S (θH,θ ∗) ≤ 0i fA holds.











⇒ ∆(θH,θ L) ≤ 0; f o r a l l θH and θL
and clearly θL ∈ argmaxθH≥θL ∆(θH,θ L). In other words if assumption A holds then
punching holes into any oﬀered interval is not an improvement.
The converse is also true: if A does not hold for some open interval θ ∈ (θ1,θ 2)
then the previous calculations show that it is an improvement to remove the whole
interval. In other words,
(θ1,θ 2) ∈ arg max
θL,θH
∆(θH,θ L)
s.t. θ1 ≤ θL ≤ θH ≤ θ2
This concludes the proof. ¥
D Proof of Lemma A implies B
Let φ = 1
ε > 0 then assumption B is equivalent to








− f (θ) ≥ 0

























and ˆ β0 (ε)=( 1− β)/(1 + ε)


















42assumption A holding at ˆ θ implies that (2 − β)f(ˆ θ)+(1− β)f0(ˆ θ)ˆ θ ≥ 0. This implies
(2 − β + ε)f(ˆ θ)+( 1− β)f0(ˆ θ)ˆ θ ≥ 0f o rε ≥ 0. So if the condition in assumption A
holds for [θ,θ pˆ β/β]t h e nΦε (θ,ε) ≥ 0f o ra l lε ≥ 0a n dθ ∈ [ˆ θ,θ p]. Given that




Φε (θ, ˜ ε)d˜ ε ≥ 0
for θ ∈ [ˆ θ,θ p] so that assumption B holds. ¥
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